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ARE SMITH AND HIALEAH 
RECONCILABLE? 
Larry Alexander* 
I 
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources 
of Oregon v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that the Free Exer-
cise Clause does not mandate religious exemptions from "gener-
ally applicable law."1 In Smith, the law of general applicability 
was one banning the use of various drugs, including peyote. The 
religious exemption in question was one for the Native American 
Church, which uses peyote in its rituals. So long as the law of 
general applicability has a legitimate secular purpose, i.e., as long 
as it is not so arbitrary as to be a denial of due process, its bur-
dening of religious practices does not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause. Put differently, the state's denial of a religious exemp-
tion need not serve more than a legitimate secular interest, con-
trary to what the law prior to Smith had been, at least as stated. 
Prior to Smith, the black letter law required that denial of a reli-
gious exemption be supported by a compelling governmental in-
terest. Not so after Smith. 
If we can schematize the free exercise doctrine after Smith, it 
would look like this: For any secular value V, the state may rank 
V above any religious value R (so long as R is manifest in con-
duct and not merely belief or expression). Or, V > R is constitu-
tionally permissible. 
II 
The citizens of Hialeah, Florida apparently find the ritual 
sacrifice of chickens by the Santerian religious sect a disgusting 
and perhaps immoral practice. In 1987, Hialeah passed an ordi-
nance banning the slaughter of animals but making so many ex-
ceptions that, for practical purposes, only the Santerians and 
perhaps wanton animal killers came within the ordinance. The 
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
1. 494 u.s. 872, 878 (1990). 
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Supreme Court found the ordinance to be violative of the Free 
Exercise Clause.z Unlike the law of general applicability in 
Smith, this law discriminated against a religious practice. 
III 
According to Smith, so long as Hialeah wants to protect the 
lives of chickens or other animals for secular reasons, e.g., Hi-
aleah values the lives of animals, it may pass a law banning the 
slaughter of animals and need not exempt the Santerians. The 
value of animal life (VA) may trump the Santerians' religious 
value R without violating the Free Exercise Clause. 
IV 
Any other (secular) V can trump R as well. (This follows 
from 1.) For example, suppose there were a religious sect whose 
practices required that wild animals be left undisturbed by 
humans. A law allowing the hunting of wild animals, perhaps for 
sport, perhaps for food, would be constitutionally permissible 
under Smith. For the secular value of hunting (VH) can permissi-
bly trump the religious value R. 
v 
Now suppose Hialeah bans all killing of animals but makes 
exceptions for sport hunting and for slaughtering animals for 
food but not for religious rituals. Hialeah has now ranked the 
value of animal life (VA) above the Santerians' religious value 
(R), and has ranked the values of hunting (VH) and meat-as-food 
(VM) above the value of animal life (VA)· Schematically, there-
sult is (V H & V M) > VA > R. Since the Free Exercise Clause 
permits VA > R, V H > R, and V M > R, logically it should permit 
Hialeah's statute. 
VI 
But now it is hard to see exactly what the constitutional 
wrong is in Hialeah. The Court treats Hialeah as "hostile" to the 
Santerians. Perhaps the Court is relying on Hialeah's affirmative 
ill will toward Santerians rather than Hialeah's mere ranking of 
their religious practices as of lower value than any secular value. 
This is a fine line to draw. It would seem to require hostility 
toward beliefs and not just hostility toward conduct, so that not 
2. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). 
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making a religious exception to laws against homicide for sacri-
fices of vestal virgins is constitutionally permissible so long as the 
state is antagonistic only to the homicidal conduct and not to the 
beliefs that motivate it. Of course, if the state were motivated by 
hostility to the beliefs, it would arguably be violating the speech 
clause of the First Amendment, and the Free Exercise Clause 
would be doing no work. 
VII 
But if having too many exceptions by itself takes a law out 
from under Smith and places it under Hialeah, then Smith must 
not be read to deny that religion carries some affirmative weight 
on the scales, even against a law of general applicability. 
This point can be made from two different angles. If excep-
tions for values like hunting or food but not for religion require a 
compelling government interest, then it must not be true that 
those values can always trump the religious value. Rather, they 
can do so only if they are much more valuable than the religious 
value. This means religious values have an affirmative (and com-
pelling) weight, contrary to the implication of Smith that reli-
gious values can be subordinated to any legitimate secular value. 
The other way to get to the same conclusion is to note that 
the law in Smith, the paradigm case of a law of general applica-
bility, can be looked at as making an exception for one secular 
value but not for a religious value. For example, why was peyote 
banned but not alcohol (which is, of course, used as a sacrament 
in some religions)? And why were drugs banned but not other 
activities that could be harmful? If the state had to show a com-
pelling interest, and not merely some legitimate secular interest 
to justify these distinctions, Smith would be directly contradicted. 
All laws of general applicability can be looked at as exceptions 
within a more general class of activities. The drug laws in Smith 
surely are, as the question about the alcohol exception indicates. 
If Smith means that Oregon does not have to justify the "peyote 
but not alcohol" distinction by showing more than a mere legiti-
mate interest, and that has to be what Smith means, then Hi-
aleah's analysis turns murky. 
VIII 
The preceding arguments also refute the account of the Free 
Exercise Clause recently put forward by Professors Eisgruber 
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and Sager.3 They defend Smith with an excellent case against the 
special privileging of religiously-based conduct. If there is some 
secular value, V" that is impaired by a law advancing another 
secular value, V2, and the state grants no exemption from the law 
where V1 is impaired, the state need not grant an exemption for a 
religious value, VR, that is also impaired. For any V2 that the 
state ranks above V], the state may also conclude V 2 > V R·4 
On the other hand, Eisgruber and Sager also argue that once 
the state grants exemptions for some, it must not "discriminate" 
against religious claimants but must treat them with equal regard. 
But an equality theory needs a metric, a currency, by which dif-
ferent claimants can be compared. If the legislature criminalizes 
alcohol but not peyote, or exempts golf courses but not churches 
from zoning laws, how is the equality claim to be assessed? One 
way would be by comparing intensity of preferences-do golfers 
desire their exemption more intensely than churchgoers? Eis-
gruber and Sager come close to endorsing this view when they 
argue that the state must adopt the religious believer's perspec-
tive in order to appreciate the gravity of his interest in an exemp-
tion.s But this looks like the intensity of preference test that 
they reject in their argument against privileging religious 
exemptions.6 
More importantly, the distinction they draw between forbid-
ding inequalities among possible claimants for exemptions and 
3. Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Con-
science: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1245 
(1994). See also Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious 
Freedom, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 577 (1996). 
4. Eisgruber and Sager illustrate this point by comparing the case of an Army of-
ficer refused permission to wear a yarmulke, as his religion requires, because of the 
Army's interest in uniform appearance with the case of another Army officer refused 
permission to go tie1ess, as a skin disorder requires, because of the same interest in uni-
form appearance. They argue that the Free Exercise Clause should not be read to privi-
lege the former's claim (by requiring an exemption) over the latter's. Eisgruber and 
Sager, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1264-65 (cited in note 3). 
At the core of Eisgruber and Sager's case for Smith is their argument that religious 
claims for exemptions can only be assigned a value by the legislature in two ways. The 
first is to assign a value based on the intensity of the desires with which they are held_ 
This allows the religious claims to be weighed against competing secular claims based on 
secular values, which can also be reduced to that currency. Eisgruber and Sager reject the 
idea that the Free Exercise Clause is nothing but a signpost pointing toward preference-
utilitarianism as a constitutional mandate. In any event, legislatures are surely preferable 
to courts in terms of assessing the intensity of the electorate's desires. 
The alternative way that religious claims can be assigned a value is from a sectarian 
standpoint. But that standpoint is, according to Eisgruber and Sager, one that the Estab-
lishment Clause rules out of bounds. 
5. !d. at 1285-86. 
6. See supra note 4. 
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not demanding privileging does not withstand analysis. In every 
case of a religion's seeking an exemption, it is demanding that its 
religious value V R not be subordinated to the secular value V 5• 
The state has ranked V s > V R· The religion wants "equality." If 
the Free Exercise Clause does not forbid the ranking V5 > VR in 
the Smith context, it cannot forbid the exact same ranking in the 
context of granting exemptions for Vs but not for VR. Only if all 
values are reduced to a common currency, such as intensity of 
desire, and only if the Constitution requires the legislature to 
deal exclusively in that currency, can we have a principled com-
parison of V s and V R· But that comparison can be made in both 
the Smith and the Hialeah contexts. 
IX 
Leaving aside cases where the government is motivated by 
hostility to a religion's beliefs, arguably a free speech issue, Hi-
aleah cannot be good law if Smith is and vice versa. Smith and 
Hialeah raised the identical issue: Do religious values have to be 
given any positive weight when put in the balance against secular 
values? Smith says "no." Hialeah says ''yes.'' They cannot both 
be correct. 
